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1 Introduction
To screen and motivate employees, firms make wide use of different forms of compensation
schemes linked to their performance. The incentives may be tied for example to the individual
performance or to the performance of the team. Individual incentives are intended to reward
employees based on reaching individual performance goals. An example is providing compen-
sation to a factory worker for producing a predetermined number of goods. Conversely, team
incentives are designed to reward each individual in the team for a joint accomplishment. Ex-
amples of team incentives include a commission for the sale of a real estate property that is
shared among the members of a sales force, and a cash bonus for a product’s development that
is given to a team of scientists or engineers.
While there are also other forms of compensation schemes, such as benefit-sharing and
tournaments, the empirical article of Bryson et al. (2012) shows that individual incentives are
very common in organizations and team-incentives have been increasingly used during the last
decade. Moreover, there is a growing interest in the adoption of team incentives in the public
service provision (see for instance Reilly et al., 2005, concerning the use of team incentives in
the U.K. National Health Service). For these reasons, in what follows I focus on these two forms
of compensation schemes and I study under what condition one outperforms the other.
In this paper, I analyze the design of optimal incentive schemes with particular interest in
the screening problem of heterogeneous employees in a team. The employees differ in terms of
their intrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated employees are interested not only in their wage
but also in the project itself. Employers do not need to raise employees’ compensation to align
their interests because they care about the project they do. The idea that employees may derive
some additional benefits from participating in a project can also be found in Delfgaauw and Dur
(2008) and Prendergast (2008). In my model, the individual degree of intrinsic motivation is
the agents’ private information.
To investigate the design of optimal incentive schemes under adverse selection within teams,
I develop a principal-agent model with multiple-agents. The principal maximizes his own profit
that increases in the total amount produced. Production depends on the individual level of
effort exerted by the employees (the agents) in the team. I assume the complementarity of the
production function.
I start considering individual incentives. In this case, the principal conditions each agent’s
wage on his own level of effort. I find that intrinsically motivated agents provide a lower level of
effort in the presence of asymmetric information with respect to the first-best. When individuals
interact in groups and their individual rewards are affected by the actions of the others in the
team, an increase in the rent paid to motivated agents results in a lower level of effort exerted
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by these individuals in the second-best.1 So we are in presence of reversal incentive, namely
situations in which an increase of rewards results in a lower effort exerted by the agents.
I study the case in which the principal offers a compensation contract that bases individual
pay on the levels of effort of each member of the team and conditions individual performance on
the effort of his colleagues in the team, i.e. team incentives. In this case, motivated agents exert
the same level of effort as in the first-best. In an adverse selection model with a complemen-
tary production function, reversal incentives do not arise if the principal uses team-incentives.
Moreover, the principal is better off providing team-incentives than individual incentives.
Despite these benefits, team incentives do not seem to be always used in the real world. This
may be explained by the agents’ attitude towards risk with respect to changes in income. If
individuals are risk averse they are unwilling to be paid on the basis of the levels of effort of each
member of the team. The best insurance a risk neutral principal can provide is to offer a wage to
each type of agents that does not depend on the type of their colleagues in the team. However,
the level of performance requested by an agent continues to depend on the performance of the
other members in the team.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section the existing literature
is reviewed; In Section 3 the general framework of the model is presented; Section 4 is devoted
to the analysis of individual and team incentives under asymmetric information and Section 5
provides a discussion of the results; finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 The Literature
A large empirical literature shows that the use of compensation schemes linked to the employees’
performance is associated with improved firms’ productivity (see among the others Lazear, 2000,
Shearer, 2004, Bandiera et al., 2005). For this reason, the use of these forms of compensations in
organizations has been the object of an increased interest among economists and policymakers
(see for an overview of articles on the provision of incentives Prendergast et al., 2011).
This paper is part of a large literature on incentives in organizations using principal-multi
agent models, much of which stems from the influential work of Holmstrom (1982). Papers such
as Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1991) have pointed out that a principal can gain
from collusion or coordination among his agents. Friebel and Schnedler (2011) considers the
1Note that this result is due to the complementarity of the production function. Therefore, it continues to hold
even if agents are heterogeneous in their productivity. In Appendix A, I consider the case in which the agents are
not interested in the project but they differ in productivity. However, this negative impact on the level of effort is
much lower. The intuition is the following. When agents are interested in the project, they receive an additional
information rent from the principal under asymmetric information. This information rent induces them to tell
the truth when their colleague is motivated too but it has a negative additional impact on the effort.
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effect of managers’ intervention on a group of workers where workers care about co-workers’
preferences because it matters for team production. They find that teams are particularly prone
to negative effect of interventions. In particular, if there are complementarities in production and
if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions by the manager
may have destructive effects. They can distort how workers perceive their co-workers and may
lead to a reduction of effort by those workers who care more about the output. These results are
in line with those found in my paper when the principal offers individual incentives. However,
while the authors analyze the impact of managers’ interventions on the effort exerted by the
agents within teams, I study the design of optimal incentives in teams and how different forms
of compensation schemes impact on the screening problem of employees with different degrees
of motivation.
Winter (2006) discuss the design of optimal incentives in teams and the way they are affected
by the information among peers. In this literature, my results under individual incentives are
in line with the findings of Winter (2009). In particular, this author studies the possibility
of incentive reversal under a moral hazard setting, while I show that the same effect arises in
presence of adverse selection concerns. In addition, I show that a solution to the incentive
reversal problem is provided by anchoring the agent’s salary and performance to those of his
colleagues in the team. The possibility of incentive reversal has also been supported by Klor
et al. (2011) using an experimental design.
While this literature focuses on the design of optimal incentive schemes in the presence of
moral hazard concerns, I primarily interested in the screening problem of intrinsically motivated
and self-interested agents. The issue of the selection of workers who are privately informed about
their motivation has been studied by Heyes (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008).2 Their
results are in line with the literature on psychological incentives where motivation is effective
in stimulating work effort even in the absence of monetary rewards (see for example Benabou
and Tirole, 2003, 2006). I find that this is indeed true under complete information on the
agents’ intrinsic motivation. However, this result might not hold in the presence of asymmetric
information. In that case, the principal has to pay an information rent in order not to mimic
selfish agents. I find that intrinsically motivated agents receive a higher wage than selfish agents.
Moreover, due to the complementarity of the production function, an increase in the rent paid
to motivated agents results in a lower level of effort exerted by both types of individuals in the
second-best. In this case, it would be in the best interest of the principal to offer team-incentives
instead of individual incentives.
This result complements the findings in the existing literature. Auriol et al. (2002), for
2For a multidimensional case see Barigozzi and Burani (2013). The authors study the screening problem when
agents are heterogenous on their productivity and their intrinsic motivation.
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example, find that the principal is better off offering team incentives when he cannot commit
to long-term contracts. In particular, they show that when workers have career concerns, the
principal uses team incentives to reduce the workers’ incentives to sabotage their colleagues.
Corts (2007) also provides a reason to use team incentives. He finds that team incentives are
desirable when multi-task problems are severe. Che and Yoo (2001) find that team incentives
are desirable in a repeated setting because they better allow the use of implicit punishments
and rewards among peers than individual incentives.
3 The model
I consider a profit-maximizing principal (she) who employs two agents, A and B. The principal-
agents relationship can be interpreted as the relationship between the owner of the firm who
offers a contract in terms of wage ωi and effort ei with i = A,B to her employees to carry out
a project. The effort of each agent is observable and verifiable.
The profit function of the principal is given by:
Π =
√
(eA eB)− (ωA + ωB), (1)
The principal is risk-neutral and she obtains a gross profit f(eA, eB) =
√
(eA eB) with the price
of the project normalized at 1. This function considers the complementarity among the levels
of effort exerted by the employees. It is strictly increasing in the effort of both agents, concave
and twice continuously differentiable with f(0, 0) = 0, fei > 0, feiej > 0, and feiei < 0 with
i, j = A,B and i 6= j.3
The employees are wealth constrained with zero initial wealth and they have a reservation
wage of zero. The key assumption of this model is that the employees can be intrinsically
motivated. This means that they may care not only about their wage but also about the project
they have to undertake. The agents’ utility function consists of their “egoistic” payoff, given by
the difference between wage and effort costs, and their intrinsic motivation. The agent i’s utility
is:
Vi(ωi, ei; θi) = ωi − 1
2
e2i + θi
√
(ei ej). (2)
The cost of exerting effort is given by a quadratic cost function C(ei) =
1
2e
2
i . The exogenous
parameter θi ≥ 0 represents agent i’s intrinsic motivation with respect to the project. The
employees’ intrinsic motivation is their private information. There are only two types of agents:
self-interested agents with θi = θ = 0 and motivated agents with θi = θ > 0.
The probability of high-type/low type is 12 . Agent A does not know if agent B is low-type or
high-type, and viceversa. I allow types to be correlated. The conditional probability distribution
3Henceforth, i and j will refer to A and B and i 6= j.
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for individual i is defined as follows:
µ =Prob(θj = θj|θi = θi) = Prob(θj = θj|θi = θi);
(1− µ) =Prob(θj = θj|θi = θi) = Prob(θj = θj|θi = θi).
(3)
Then, the conditional probability of having agents of the same type is equal to µ, while that of
having individuals of different type is 1−µ. If µ = 12 , the types are independent, while if µ > 12 ,
the types are positively correlated. Note that I assume µ ∈ (0, 1).
The timing of the game is as follows. In the initial stage 0, each agent is informed about
his own type; in stage 1, the principal offers a menu of contracts consisting of levels of effort and
wages; in stage 2, agents independently decide whether to participate or not in the project. If
either of them does not participate, production does not take place and the game ends. If both
agents participate, the game proceeds as follows. In stage 3, the type of contract chosen by each
agent becomes public information; in stage 4, the effort is exerted, the project is undertaken
and wages are paid.
The assumption that the type of contract chosen by each agent becomes known before
production starts is made for the following reason. This allows the principal to potentially
condition each agent’s wage and level of performance on those chosen by his colleague in the
team. In contrast, I do not assume that the parties are able to renegotiate the contract.
All the mathematical computations and proofs of the results are in Appendix A.
In the following sections, I analyze the case in which the principal has perfect information
on the agents’ intrinsic motivation (Subsection 3.1) and the case in which he does not (Section
4).
3.1 The Benchmark Case
I study the optimal incentive contracts in the presence of a team-work problem in which the
level of effort of each agent can affect the marginal benefit of his colleague.
With perfect information, the principal need not offer a rent to the employees because she
has all the necessary information to implement the efficient levels of effort. The wage makes
each agent indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract, given the required level of
effort. It just covers the cost of effort incurred by the agent minus his direct benefit derived
from enjoying the project:
ωi =
1
2
e2i − θi
√
(ei ej). (4)
So the principal maximizes the following:
Π = (1 + θi + θj)
√
(ei ej)− 1
2
(
e2i + e
2
j
)
. (5)
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Applying the first order condition with respect to ei and ej , the first-best levels of effort are
obtained:
eFBi = e
FB
j =
1 + θi + θj
2
(6)
The left-hand side is the private marginal cost of exerting effort, while the right-hand side is
the marginal benefit of exerting effort for the project. This marginal benefit consists of the
marginal benefit obtained by the principal and the marginal benefit due to the individuals’
intrinsic motivation. Note that agent i’s level of effort is positively affected by the intrinsic
motivation of his colleague. As usual, the first-best contract induces agents to exert the level
of effort that maximizes the joint surplus. Hence, the resulting production levels are socially
optimal.4
Substituting the levels of effort provided into equation (4), I obtain the optimal wages:
ωFBi =
(
1 + θi + θj
2
)(
1− 3θi + θj
4
)
(7)
When the agents’ intrinsic motivation lies in the following interval θi ∈
[
0, 12
]
with i = A,B,
the employees receive a positive wage. Otherwise, due to the limited liability condition, the
motivated agents earn a wage of 0.5 A higher value of θi reduces the wage paid to agent i. This
means that agents with a high intrinsic motivation receive lower incentive pay at the optimum.
Take, for instance, θB > θA. In this case, the principal will offer a bigger transfer to agent A
who is less interested to the project than agent B. This is because a more motivated agent
exerts effort to participate in the project even if he receives a low compensation.
Proposition 1. The levels of effort exerted by the individuals are the same, i.e. eFBi = e
FB
j ,
irrespective of their degrees of intrinsic motivation. If θi > θj, then ω
FB
i < ω
FB
j .
Under complete information on θ, the agents’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on
the levels of effort exerted by both agents. Moreover, intrinsically motivated individuals exert
a given a level of effort even if they receive a lower compensation for that. This result is in line
with the existing literature where motivation is effective in stimulating work effort even in the
absence of monetary rewards (see for example Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006).
4 Screening Problem and Compensation Schemes
In this section, I analyze the effect of different incentive pay on the employees’ productivity
within teams under asymmetric information. Individuals’ intrinsic motivation is their private
4Since the participation constraints bind regardless of the agents’ type, the principal extracts all the surplus
above the agents’ reservation utility.
5When θi >
1
2
, agent i earns a rent due to his limited liability.
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information but the effort is observable and verifiable. In subsection 4.1, I consider individual
incentives. In this case, the principal conditions each agent’s wage only on his own level of effort,
i.e. ωi(ei). Due to the complementarity of the production function, I find that intrinsically
motivated agents as well as selfish agents provide a lower level of effort compared to the first-
best. We are in presence of reversal incentives. In subsection 4.2, I consider team-incentives
where the principal offers a compensation contract that bases individual pay on the output of
the team, ωi(ei, ej), and conditions an agent’s performance on the effort of his colleague, i.e.
ei = ei(ej). In this case, motivated agents exert the same level of effort as in the first-best. In
section 4, I discuss the results of these two forms of incentive pay.
4.1 Individual Incentives
I start considering the case where the principal conditions each agent’s wage on his own level
of effort, i.e. ωi(ei) with i = A,B. Without loss of generality, I focus on the direct revelation
mechanism and to the truth-telling contracts where the agent of a certain type will choose the
contract corresponding to that type.
The principal chooses a menu of contract designed for different types {(eiH , ωiH(eiH)), (eiL, ωiL(eiL))}
to maximize her profit function:
Π =
µ
2
[√
(eiHejH) +
√
(eiLejL)− ωiH − ωjH − ωiL − ωjL
]
+
+
1− µ
2
[√
(eiHejL) +
√
(eiLejH)− ωiH − ωjL − ωiL − ωjH
] (8)
subject to incentive and participation constraints. Incentive constraints require that is optimal
for each agent to report his type truthfully, while participation constraints require that each
agent have to be at least as well off by participating as they would be by not participating in
the project:
Vi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) ≥ Vi(ωiL, eiL; θ) (ICiH)
Vi(ωiL, eiL; θ) ≥ Vi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) (ICiL)
Vi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) ≥ 0 (PCiH)
Vi(ωiL, eiL; θ) ≥ 0 (PCiL)
It is possible to reduce the number of relevant constraints (see Appendix A). As usual, I obtain
that the incentive constraint for the θ-agent (ICiH) is binding (because the difficulty comes from
a θ-agent willing to claim that he is self-interested rather than the reverse). Under complete
information the intrinsically motivated agent always receives a lower wage. Under asymmetric
information, this individual can pretend to be a low type. The principal has to offer him an
incentive to reveal his type. In contrast, the participation constraint for the θ-agent (PCiL)
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is the binding one (because if a menu of contracts enables an unmotivated agent to reach his
status quo utility level, it will be also the case for a motivated one).
Using the participation and the incentive constraints, the optimal wages have to satisfy the
following equations if the employees are high-type and low-type, respectively:
ωiH =
1
2
e2iH − θ
[
µ
√
(eiHejH) + (1− µ)
√
(eiHejL)
]
+ θ
[
µ
√
(eiLejH) + (1− µ)
√
(eiLejL)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information Rent
;
ωiL =
1
2
e2iL
(9)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. To induce separation of types, the principal pays an information rent
to the intrinsically motivated agent. This rent is obtained through the amount of effort exerted
by the agents and the magnitude of this rent is crucially affected by the parameter of asymmetric
information θ. Conversely, the transfer offered to the θ-agent covers his cost of exerting effort
and he does not earn any information rent.
Substituting the transfers in the principal’s utility and taking the first order derivative, the
levels of effort are obtained under individual incentives and the following proposition illustrates
the main results.
Proposition 2. The levels of effort exerted by both types of agents are lower under individual
incentives than under complete information, i.e. eIIiL < e
FB
i and e
II
iH < e
FB
i for any value of
θ > 0.
Both individuals contribute less than under complete information. This means that there is
distortion at the top and at the bottom. When individuals interact in groups and their individual
rewards are affected by the actions of the others in the team, an increase in the rent paid to
motivated agents results in a lower level of effort exerted by both types of individuals in the
second-best. This result is due to the complementarity of the production function and it is in
line with the findings of Winter (2009).6 The author studied the possibility of incentive reversal
under a moral hazard setting, while I show that the same effect arises in presence of adverse
selection concerns.
The intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the level of effort exerted by motivated
agents, but it has a negative impact on the level of effort exerted by selfish agents. However,
this negative impact on the level of effort of the selfish agent is low when µ is low. When the
composition of the team is heterogeneous, the reduction of effort by the self-interested agent is
6This result continues to hold even if agents are heterogeneous in their productivity. However, this negative
impact on the levels of effort is much lower. In Appendix A, I consider the case in which the agents are not
interested in the project and differ in their productivity.
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less important. In other words, a selfish agent exerts a higher level of effort if the conditional
probability of being in a team with a motivated agent is high, i.e. 1− µ is high.
Substituting the levels of effort into equation (9), the wages paid in the second-best under
individual incentives are obtained and the results are provided by the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The wage paid to the motivated agent is always higher than the one paid to the
selfish agent, i.e. ωIIiH > ω
II
iL for any values of θ > 0.
Intrinsically motivated agents always receive a higher wage than selfish agents. This result
goes in the opposite direction to the one found in a complete information setting. This is because
motivated agents obtain an information rent in order not to mimic selfish agents. This rent
depends on the degree of intrinsic motivation. When the degree of intrinsic motivation is very
high, the information rent that the principal pays to motivated agents is so high that the principal
can decide to exclude the low-type. However, the necessary condition for full participation, that
is eIIiL > 0, is always satisfied if the probability to have homogeneous individuals is sufficiently
low, that is µ < 23 . This is because µ has a negative impact on the level of effort exerted by
selfish employees.
4.2 Team-Incentives
In this subsection, the principal conditions the wage on the effort of both agents, i.e. ωi(ei, ej)
with i = A,B, and each agent’s effort depends on that provided by his colleague, i.e. ei = ei(ej)
for i, j = A,B and i 6= j. The standard revelation principle of the principal-agent theory is used
and the principal chooses a menu of contract designed for different types
{(eiH(ejH), eiH(ejL), ωiH(eiH , ejH), ωiH(eiH , ejL)), (eiL(ejH), eiL(ejL), ωiL(eiL, ejH), ωiL(eiL, ejL))}
to maximize equation (8) subject to incentive and participation constraints. Note that under
team-incentives, the incentive constraint for motivated (selfish) agents requires that the expected
utility that a motivated (selfish) agent receives to be in a team has to be higher than the expected
utility obtained by pretending to be selfish (motivated). In expectation a motivated (selfish)
agent knows that with probability µ he will be in a team with another motivated (selfish) agent
and with probability 1−µ with a selfish (motivated) agent. Participation constraints guarantee
that in expectation both types of agents accept the contract.
EθjVi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) ≥ EθjVi(ωiL, eiL; θ) (ICiH)
EθjVi(ωiL, eiL; θ) ≥ EθjVi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) (ICiL)
EθjVi(ωiH , eiH ; θ) ≥ 0 (PCiH)
EθjVi(ωiL, eiL; θ) ≥ 0 (PCiL)
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Again, it is possible to reduce the number of relevant constraints and I find that (ICiH) and
(PCiL) are the binding ones.
Taking the first-order condition of equation (8) with respect to eik(ejr) with i, j = A,B
and k, r can be either motivated or selfish agents, i.e. k, r ∈ {L,H}, the levels of effort under
team-incentives are obtained and the following proposition illustrates the main results.
Proposition 4. Under team incentives, motivated employees exert the same level of effort as
in the first-best, while selfish employees exert a lower level of effort than in the first-best.
As in the standard case where the production function is linear, there is distortion just at
the bottom. This is an improvement with respect to individual-incentives.
Remark 1. In an adverse selection model with a complementary production function, reversal
incentives do not arise if the principal uses team-incentives.
Concerning the choice of the team-incentives, the principal at the optimum satisfies the
following equations:
µ[ωiH(eiH , ejH)] + (1− µ)[ωiH(eiH , ejL)] =
[
1
2
µe2iH(ejH) +
1
2
(1− µ)e2iH(ejL)
]
+
−θ
[
µ
√
(eiH ejH) + (1− µ)
√
(eiH ejL)
]
+ θ
[
µ
√
(eiL ejH) + (1− µ)
√
(eiL ejL)
] (10)
µ[ωiL(eiL, ejL)] + (1− µ)[ωiL(eiL, ejH)] =
[
1
2
µe2iL(ejL) +
1
2
(1− µ)e2iL(ejH)
]
(11)
The motivated agent receives a linear combination of wages obtained when the agent is in the
team with a motivated or a selfish agent. This linear combination has to be at least equal to the
sum of the cost of exerting effort minus the agent’s own intrinsic motivation and plus the infor-
mation rent paid to him. This rent is obtained through the amount of effort put in by the agents
and the magnitude of this rent is crucially affected by the parameter of asymmetric information
θ. It is also possible to notice that the rent is equal to θ
[
µ
√
(eiL ejH) + (1− µ)
√
(eiL ejL)
]
that is the same rent found in the previous section. In contrast, the linear combination of wages
paid to the selfish agent is exactly equal to the sum of the cost of exerting effort when he is in
the team with a selfish or a motivated agent. The selfish agent does not earn any information
rent irrespective of whether is in the team with a selfish or a motivated agent.
Remark 2. When the agents are risk-neutral, the principal can pay any possible combination
of wages that satisfy equations (10) and (11). There exist infinite solutions to this problem.
5 Profits Comparison and Discussion
From the previous section, we have seen that when the principal offers individual incentives to
her agents, the levels of effort provided by both types of agents is lower than in the first-best
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and we are in presence of reversal incentives. To solve this problem due to the complementarity
of the production function, the principal can use team-incentives. In this case, motivated agents
exert the same level of effort as in the first-best and there is distortion just at the bottom as in
the standard model. In addition, the principal offers a linear combination of wages paid on the
basis of the levels of effort of each member of the team.
Now, it is interesting to study in which situation the principal is better off. Comparing
the profits obtained in the two cases, the principal benefits from offering team-work incentives.
Graphically, Figure 1 illustrates this result.
P with Team-Incentives
P with Individual Incentives
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Θ0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
Figure 1: Profits Comparison with Individual and Team-Incentives
This is because under team-incentives the principal bases the contract on more information
and, as a result, the constraints to induce the agents’ participation and incentive compatibility
are milder, as they must hold in expectations.
Despite these benefits, team-incentives seem not to be used in practise everywhere. A reason
which may explain why individuals receive a contract that does not depend on the contract
chosen by his colleague in the team is the agents’ attitude towards risk with respect to income
shocks. If individuals are risk averse they are unwilling to be paid on the basis of the type of
contract chosen by the other member of the team. This kind of contract would introduce more
risk as each agent must bear the risk of having the contract tied to the types of his colleagues
about which he is uncertain. To compensate them for this increase in the risk, the principal
would pay a higher wage. Then, the most efficient insurance would require that the principal
offers a fixed wage to each type of agent independently of the type of his colleague in the team.
To see this consider equation (10) and (11). When the agent is risk-averse the expected utility
of the salary is no longer equivalent to the expected salary.
Finally, I also study under which mechanism the employees are better off. While the selfish
employees do not earn any information rent and their utility is equal to 0 under individual and
team incentives, the motivated employees receive a rent that depends on the levels of effort
exerted by the agents in the team. Comparing the utility of the intrinsically motivated agents
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obtained in the two cases, the employees benefit from receiving individual incentives. This result
is illustrated in Figure 2.
Individual Incentives
Team Incentives
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Θ0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
V
Figure 2: Intrinsically Motivated Agents’ Utility with Individual and Team-Incentives for any
values of θ and µ = 12 .
Remark 3. The principal prefers team-incentives, while motivated employees prefer individual
incentives.
6 Conclusions
The standard economic theory argues that an increase in monetary incentives should induce
agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, I have demonstrated that this result may not hold
under individual incentives in a teamwork environment. In particular, when the production
function is complementary, incentive reversal arises. An increase in the rent paid to motivated
agents results to lower levels of effort exerted by both agents in the team. A possible solution to
this problem was found in offering team-incentives to the agents instead of individual incentives.
In that case, the effort provided by motivated agents coincided with the one obtained under the
first-best. In addition, profits were higher under team-incentives than individual incentives. As
a result, the principal is better off offering team incentives.
For future research, it would be interesting to analyse the impact of other forms of compensa-
tion schemes, such as tournaments or benefit-sharing, on the screening problem of heterogeneous
employees. I am also interested in studying how the presence of other forms of agents’ hetero-
geneity affect the optimal contract. In a recent paper, for example, I augment the standard
adverse selection model by assuming that the agents suffer a utility loss whenever they feel to be
worse off than their boss or/and their colleagues (see Manna, 2015). Preliminary results show
that the envy towards their more productive colleagues distorts the levels of effort exerted by
the low-type employees. However, when the agents are also envious towards their boss, this
14
distortion is mitigated by the envy parameter towards their boss. Moreover, envy can make
profit sharing optimal.
Finally, this simple mechanism leads to new insights concerning the design of optimal in-
centive schemes with particular interest in the screening problem of heterogeneous employees
in a team. While in this article the focus has been on a private organization, it might also be
extended to other contexts, such as a political setting and a public good provision.
15
References
Auriol, E., Friebel, G., Pechlivanos, L., 2002. Career concerns in teams. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 20 (2), 289–307.
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., Rasul, I., 2005. Social preferences and the response to incentives:
Evidence from personnel data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 917–962.
Barigozzi, F., Burani, N., 2013. Bidimensional screening with intrinsically motivated workers.
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2003. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The Review of Economic
Studies 70 (3), 489–520.
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006. Incentives and prosocial behavior. The American Economic Review
96, 1652–1678.
Bryson, A., Freeman, R., Lucifora, C., Pellizzari, M., Perotin, V., 2012. Paying for performance:
Incentive pay schemes and employees’ financial participation. Tech. rep., Centre for Economic
Performance, LSE.
Che, Y.-K., Yoo, S.-W., 2001. Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic Review, 525–
541.
Corts, K. S., 2007. Teams versus individual accountability: Solving multitask problems through
job design. The Rand Journal of Economics 38 (2), 467–479.
Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R., 2007. Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization 62 (4), 605–624.
Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R., 2008. Incentives and workers’ motivation in the public sector*. The
Economic Journal 118 (525), 171–191.
Friebel, G., Schnedler, W., 2011. Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control. Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization 78 (1), 1–13.
Heyes, A., 2005. The economics of vocation or ’why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse’? Journal
of health economics 24 (3), 561–569.
Holmstrom, B., 1982. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 324–340.
Holmstro¨m, B., Milgrom, P., 1990. Regulating trade among agents. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift fu¨r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 85–105.
16
Itoh, H., 1991. Incentives to help in multi-agent situations. Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, 611–636.
Klor, E. F., Kube, S., Winter, E., Zultan, R., 2011. Can higher bonuses lead to less effort?
incentive reversal in teams.
Lazear, E. P., 2000. Performance pay and productivity. The American Economic Review 90 (5),
1346–1361.
Manna, E., 2015. Employees’ envy towards their boss and their colleagues. Mimeo.
Prendergast, C., 2008. Intrinsic motivation and incentives. The American economic review, 201–
205.
Prendergast, C., et al., 2011. What have we learnt about pay for performance? geary lecture
winter 2010. The Economic and Social Review 42 (2), 113–134.
Reilly, P., Phillipson, J., Smith, P., 2005. Team-based pay in the united kingdom. Compensation
& Benefits Review 37 (4), 54–60.
Shearer, B., 2004. Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment.
The Review of Economic Studies 71 (2), 513–534.
Winter, E., 2006. Optimal incentives for sequential production processes. The RAND Journal
of Economics 37 (2), 376–390.
Winter, E., 2009. Incentive reversal. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1 (2), 133–
147.
17
A Appendix A
A.1 Benchmark Case: Proof of Proposition 1
Under complete information, the principal maximizes the following:
Π = (1 + θi + θj) (ei ej)
1
2 − 1
2
(
e2i + e
2
j
)
(12)
Applying the first order condition with respect to ei and ej , I obtain the following system of
equations: 

∂Π
∂ei
: 12 (eiej)
1
2 ej(1 + θi + θj) = ei
∂Π
∂ej
: 12 (eiej)
1
2 ei(1 + θi + θj) = ej
Solving the system of equations, the first-best levels of effort are obtained:
eFBi = e
FB
j =
1 + θi + θj
2
(13)
The wages are equal to:
ωi =
1
2
e2i − θi(ei ej)
1
2 and ωj =
1
2
e2j − θj(ei ej)
1
2 . (14)
Substituting the first-best levels of effort into equation (14), I obtain that:
ωFBi > ω
FB
j if
1
2
(
1 + θi + θj
2
)2
− θi
(
1 + θi + θj
2
)
>
1
2
(
1 + θi + θj
2
)2
− θj
(
1 + θi + θj
2
)
After some simple computations, it is possible to notice that ωFBi > ω
FB
j if θi < θj.
A.2 Which Are the Binding Constraints?
I want to show that the incentive constraint for the θ-agent is binding, while the participation
constraint of the θ-agent is the binding one.
Proof. I have the following incentive and participation constraints for individual i:
ωiH−1
2
e2iH+θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ ωiL−1
2
e2iL+θ
[
µ(eiLejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejL)
1
2
]
(ICiH)
ωiL − 1
2
e2iL ≥ ωiH −
1
2
e2iH (ICiL)
ωiH − 1
2
e2iH + θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ 0 (PCiH)
ωiL − 1
2
e2iL ≥ 0 (PCiL)
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Let’s determine which constraints bind.
First, note that if equations (ICiH) and (PCiL) are satisfied, then
ωiH− 1
2
e2iH+θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ θ
[
µ(eiLejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejL)
1
2
]
≥ 0 (15)
Equation (15) reflects the fact that a motivated agent receives more surplus from the project
than a self-interested agent. The participation constraint for the intrinsically motivated agent:
ωiH − 1
2
e2iH + θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ 0
is satisfied as well. Furthermore, it will not be binding because θ
[
µ(eiLejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejL) 12
]
≥
0 has to be satisfied as well. In contrast, the participation constraint for the low-type must be
binding.
Next, the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-type must be binding, that is:
ωiH =
1
2
e2iH − θ
[
µ (eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ) (eiHejL)
1
2
]
+ θ
[
µ (eiLejH)
1
2 + (1− µ) (eiLejL)
1
2
]
If this incentive were not binding, the principal could increase ωiH slightly and keep all con-
straints satisfied. And the incentive constraint for the low-type, that is
ωiL ≥ 1
2
e2iL − θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
cannot be binding given that θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL) 12
]
≥ 0 has to be satisfied.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In this subsection, I show that the levels of effort exerted by both types of agents under individual
incentives are lower than under the first-best. In mathematical terms, this means that eIIiL < e
FB
i
and eIIiH < e
FB
i for any values of θ > 0 and µ > 0.
The principal chooses the contract {eiH , eiL, ωiH(eiH), ωiL(eiL)} to maximize equation (8)
subject to the incentive constraint for the high-type, the participation constraint of the low-type
and non negativity conditions on the levels of effort. The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L =
µ
2
[
(eiHejH)
1
2 + (eiLejL)
1
2
]
+
1− µ
2
[
(eiHejL)
1
2 + (eiLejH)
1
2
]
− 1
2
[ωiH + ωjH + ωiL + ωjL] +
+λ1
[
ωiH − 1
2
e2iH + θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiHejL)
1
2
]
− θ
[
µ(eiLejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejL)
1
2
]]
+
+λ1
[
ωjH − 1
2
e2jH + θ
[
µ(eiHejH)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejH)
1
2
]
− θ
[
µ(eiHejL)
1
2 + (1− µ)(eiLejL)
1
2
]]
+
+λ2
[
ωiL − 1
2
e2iL + ωjL −
1
2
e2jL
]
(16)
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The first-order conditions are:

∂L
∂ωiH
= ∂L∂ωjH : −
1
2 + λ1 = 0
∂L
∂ωiL
= ∂L∂ωjL : −
1
2 + λ2 = 0
∂L
∂eiH
: 12µ(1 + 2θ) (eiHejH)
1
2 ejH +
1
2 [(1− µ)(1 + θ)− µθ] (eiHejL)
1
2 ejL = eiH
∂L
∂ejL
: 12 [µ(1 + 2θ)− 2θ] (eiLejL)
1
2 eiL +
1
2 [(1 − µ)(1 + θ)− µθ] (eiHejL)
1
2 eiH = ejL
∂L
∂ejH
: 12µ(1 + 2θ) (eiHejH)
1
2 eiH +
1
2 [(1− µ)(1 + θ)− µθ] (eiLejH)
1
2 eiL = ejH
∂L
∂eiL
: 12 [µ(1 + 2θ)− 2θ] (eiLejL)
1
2 ejL +
1
2 [(1 − µ)(1 + θ)− µθ] (eiLejH)
1
2 ejH = eiL
It is possible to notice that λ1 = λ2 =
1
2 . Let A =
1
2 [µ(1 + 2θ)], B =
1
2 [(1 − µ)(1 + θ) − µθ]
and C = 12 [µ(1 + 2θ) − 2θ] = A − θ, it is possible to rewritten the system of equation in the
following way: 

∂L
∂eiH
: A (eiHejH)
1
2 ejH +B (eiHejL)
1
2 ejL = eiH
∂L
∂ejH
: A (eiHejH)
1
2 eiH +B (eiLejH)
1
2 eiL = ejH
∂L
∂eiL
: C (eiLejL)
1
2 ejL +B (eiLejH)
1
2 ejH = eiL
∂L
∂ejL
: C (eiLejL)
1
2 eiL +B (eiHejL)
1
2 eiH = ejL
When A = C, eiH = eiL =
1
2(1 + θ) <
1
2(1 + 2θ) = e
FB
i . This would be the best I could get
under second-best and, in any case, it would be lower than the result obtained in the first-best
when both agents are motivated. However, A = C if θ = 0 that it is never the case. When
A 6= C eIIiH ∈
(
1
2 ,
1
2(1 + θ)
]
and eIIiL =
[
1
2(1− θ), 12
)
. Proposition 2 is satisfied for any values of θ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
I want to prove that ωIIiH > ω
II
iL for any values of θ. In the previous subsection, I have found
that the levels of effort exerted by both types of individuals are in the intervals specified above.
An increase of the levels effort has a positive impact on the wages. In order to prove that
ωIIiH > ω
II
iL, I consider the extreme case in which motivated agents exert their lowest level of
effort while unmotivated agents their highest. If the inequality holds in this extreme case, it
always holds.
The lowest level of effort exerted by motivated agents is eiH =
1
2 + ǫ while the highest level
of effort exerted by unmotivated agents is eiL =
1
2 − ǫ where ǫ tends to 0. Substituting these
values into equation (9), I obtain that ωIIiL < ω
II
iH if
1
2
(
1
2
− ǫ
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωII
iL(eiL=
1
2
−ǫ)
<
1
2
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)2
− θ
[
µ
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
+ (1− 2µ)
((
1
2
+ ǫ
)(
1
2
− ǫ
)) 1
2
]
+ θ
[
(1− µ)
(
1
2
− ǫ
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωII
iH(eiH=
1
2
+ǫ)
This is indeed true if
θ > − 2ǫ
(1− 2µ)(−1 +√1− 4ǫ2 + 2ǫ)
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That is always the case for ǫ that tends to 0. I have proved that the inequality holds in this
extreme case and, as a result, it always holds.
A.5 Team-Incentives and Proof of Proposition 4
The expected utility that a motivated agent receives to be in a team with a motivated agent
with probability µ or with a self-interested agent with probability 1 − µ has to be higher than
the expected utility obtained by pretending to be selfish. In the same way, the expected utility
that a selfish agent receives to be in a team with a selfish agent with probability µ or with a
motivated agent with probability 1 − µ has to be higher than the expected utility obtained by
pretending to be motivated.7 The incentive constraints for motivated and selfish individuals are
respectively equal to:
µ
[
ωiH(eiH , ejH)− 1
2
e2iH(ejH) + θ(eiHejH)
1
2
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiH(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2iH(ejL) + θ(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ µ
[
ωiL(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2iL(ejH) + θ(eiLejH)
1
2
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2iL(ejL) + θ(eiLejL)
1
2
]
µ
[
ωiL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2iL(ejL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiL(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2iL(ejH)
]
≥ µ
[
ωiH(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2iH(ejL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiH(eiH , ejH)− 1
2
e2iH(ejH)
]
The participation constraints for motivated and selfish individuals are respectively equal to:
µ
[
ωiH(eiH , ejH)− 1
2
e2iH(ejH) + θ(eiHejH)
1
2
]
+(1−µ)
[
ωiH(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2iH(ejL) + θ(eiHejL)
1
2
]
≥ 0
µ
[
ωiL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2iL(ejL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiL(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2iL(ejH)
]
≥ 0
Again, the incentive constraint for the θ-agent is binding. The θ-agent can be willing to
claim that he is selfish. At the same time, the participation constraint for the θ-agent is the
binding one. If the contract satisfies the participation constraint of the selfish agent, it will also
satisfy the participation constraint of the motivated agent. The proof of these results is similar
7Remember that µ is the conditional probability of having individuals of the same type in the team.
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to the one provided for individual incentives. The Lagrangian of this problem is:
L =
µ
2
[√
(eiHejH) +
√
(eiLejL)− ωiH(eiH , ejH)− ωjH(eiH , ejH)− ωiL(eiL, ejL)− ωjL(eiL, ejH)
]
+
+
1− µ
2
[√
(eiHejL) +
√
(eiLejH)− ωiH(eiH , ejL)− ωjL(eiH , ejL)− ωiL(eiL, ejH)− ωjH(eiL, ejH)
]
+
+ λ1
{
µ
[
ωiH(eiH , ejH)− 1
2
e2iH(ejH) + θ
√
(eiHejH)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiH(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2iH(ejL) + θ
√
(eiHejL)
]}
+
+ λ1
{
µ
[
ωjH(eiH , ejH)− 1
2
e2jH(eiH) + θ
√
(eiHejH)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωjH(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2jH(eiL) + θ
√
(eiLejH)
]}
+
− λ1
{
µ
[
ωiL(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2iL(ejH) + θ
√
(eiLejH)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2iL(ejL) + θ
√
(eiLejL)
]}
+
− λ1
{
µ
[
ωjL(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2jL(eiH) + θ
√
(eiHejL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωjL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2jL(eiL) + θ
√
(eiLejL)
]}
+ λ2
{
µ
[
ωiL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2iL(ejL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωiL(eiL, ejH)− 1
2
e2iL(ejH)
]}
+
+ λ2
{
µ
[
ωjL(eiL, ejL)− 1
2
e2jL(eiL)
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ωjL(eiH , ejL)− 1
2
e2jL(eiH)
]}
The first-order conditions are:

∂L
∂ωiH (eiH ,ejH )
: −µ2 + λ1µ = 0⇒ λ1 = 12
∂L
∂ωiH (eiH ,ejL)
: −1−µ2 + λ1(1− µ) = 0⇒ λ1 = 12
∂L
∂ωiL(eiL,ejH)
: −1−µ2 − λ1µ+ λ2(1− µ) = 0⇒ λ2 = 12(1−µ)
∂L
∂ωiL(eiL,ejL)
: −µ2 − λ1(1− µ) + λ2µ = 0⇒ λ2 = 12µ
∂L
∂eiH (ejH )
: eiH(ejH) =
ejH
2
√
(eiHejH )
(1 + 2θ) = eFBiH (ejH)
∂L
∂eiH (ejL)
: eiH(ejL) =
ejL
2
√
(eiHejL)
(1 + θ) = eFBiH (ejL)
∂L
∂eiL(ejH )
: eiL(ejH) =
ejH
2
√
(eiLejH )
(1− θ) < eFBiL (ejH)
∂L
∂eiL(ejL)
: eiL(ejL) =
ejL
2
√
(eiLejL)
(1− 2θ) < eFBiL (ejL)
Solving the system of equations, the levels of effort exerted by the agents are obtained. I find
that motivated agents exert the same level of effort as in the first-best, while selfish agents exert
a lower level of effort.
A.6 Heterogeneity in their Productivity
As an extension, I consider the case in which agents do not care about the project but they differ
in their productivity. In particular, I am interested in the impact of differences in the employees’
productivity on their effort under individual incentives. I find that, even in this case, both types
of agents provide a lower level of effort than in the first-best. However, this negative impact on
effort is much lower than the one found when agents differ in their intrinsic motivation.
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The principal maximizes the profit function in equation (1), while agent i’ s utility function
is:
V ′i = ωi −
1
2
αie
2
i (17)
where the exogenous parameter αi is agent i’s cost of production.
Under complete information, the principal maximizes the following:
Π =
√
(eiej)− 1
2
(αiei + αjej) (18)
Applying the first order condition, I obtain the first-best levels of effort:
eFBi =
[
1
2α
3/4
i α
1/4
j
]
; eFBj =
[
1
2α
3/4
j α
1/4
i
]
. (19)
Of course an increase of the agent i’s cost of production has a negative impact on his own level
of effort. Moreover, the agent i’s level of effort is negatively affected by the cost of production
of his colleague αj but the impact is lower than the one of αi.
Now, I consider the case in which employees’ productivity is their private information. For
simplicity, employees can have only two types of abilities: efficient agent with a low cost αi = α
and inefficient agent with αi = α with α > α. Each agent does not know the type of his colleague
in the team. The conditional probability distribution for individual i is as follows:
v =Prob(αj = αj |αi = αi) = Prob(αj = αj|αi = αi);
(1− v) =Prob(αj = αj |θi = αi) = Prob(αj = αj |αi = αi).
(20)
The conditional probability of having agents of the same type is equal to v, while that of having
individuals of different type is 1− v.
The principal offers different contracts designed for different types and maximizes the fol-
lowing:
max
eiH , ωiH , eiL, ωiL
=
v
2
[f(eiH , ejH) + f(eiL, ejL)] +
1− µ
2
[f(eiH , ejL) + f(eiL, ejH)] +
− 1
2
[ωiH + ωjH + ωiL + ωjL]
(21)
subject to the incentive constraint of the efficient agent and the participation constraint of the
inefficient one.
ωiH =
1
2
αe2iH +
1
2
(α− α)e2iL;
ωiL =
1
2
αe2iL
(22)
To induce separation of types, the principal pays an information rent to the efficient agent
that is equal to 12 (△α)e2iL.
23
Substituting the transfers in the principal’s utility and taking the first order derivative, the
levels of effort have to satisfy the following equations:
αeiH = vf
′(eiH , ejH) + (1− v)f ′(eiH , ejL)
(2α − α)eiL = vf ′(eiL, ejL) + (1− v)f ′(eiL, ejH)
(23)
The information rent does not affect directly the level of effort of the efficient agent but
indirectly through a reduction of the effort put in by the inefficient agent. Even in this case,
both individuals contribute less than under complete information. However, this negative impact
on the levels of effort is much lower. In order to see that, I compare the results obtained by
the two forms of heterogeneity. When agents are heterogenous in their intrinsic motivation, the
levels of effort have to satisfy the following equations:
eiH = µf
′(eiH , ejH)(1 + 2θ) + (1− µ)f ′(eiH , ejL)(1 + θ) −µθ[f ′(eiH , ejL)]
eiL = µf
′(eiL, ejL) + (1− µ)f ′(eiL, ejH)(1 + θ) −2(1− µ)θ[f ′(eiL, ejL)]
(24)
When agents are interested in the project, they receive an additional information rent from
the principal. This information rent induces them to tell the truth on their types and it has
a negative impact on the effort of both types of agents. The motivated agent reduces his level
of effort proportionally to the loss he obtains when his colleague pretends to be selfish when
instead he is motivated too, i.e. −µθ[f ′(eiH , ejL)]. The selfish agent reduces his level of effort
proportionally to twice the loss obtained by pretending to be low-type when his colleague is
low-type too, i.e. −2(1 − µ)θ[f ′(eiL, ejL)]. As a result, reversal incentives are stronger when
agents are heterogenous in their intrinsic motivation than in their productivity.
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